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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED SWEDIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, CASE NO, 
15935 
-vs-
DEAN WALL, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant for 
recovery of certain sums of money due and owing. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff 
on plaintiff's complaint and judgment by default was rendered 
in favor of defendant on defendant's counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment by default 
entered on respondent's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 17, 1976, plaintiff filed the instant cause 
of action against defendant for various sums owing which 
totaled $2,251.60 plus interest. 
On January 10, 1977, defendant filed an answer denying 
plaintiff's allegations and claiming to reserve the right to 
file a counterclaim against plaintiff. 
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on March 23, 1977, plaintiff filed a request for 
admissions and served same on defendant. Defendant responded 
to said requests on May 27, 1977, beyond the 30-day period 
required for such response. 
On June 3, 1977, defendant filed a counterclaim against 
plaintiff, nearly six months after defendant filed his answer. 
Leave of court was not obtained by defendant to file said 
counterclaim after such a lapse of time. 
On March 6, 1978, plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on defendant's failure to file a timely response 
to plaintiff's request for admissions. The hearing on the moti 
was continued to time of trial on stipulation by counsel. 
At the outset of the trial on May 9, 1978, plaintiff 
renewed his "1::::1: _ -:c:· c,_)r summary judgment which was granted by 
the trial judge for the sum of $1,723.60. 
The evening before trial, counsel for plaintiff dis-
covered he had not filed a reply to defendant's counterclaim. 
He then prepared a reply and served a copy thereof on counsel 
for defendant just prior to trial. Until that time, counsel 
for defendant was unaware that no reply had been filed. 
After plaintiff's summary judgment was granted, counsel 
for defendant requested the court to enter the default of 
plaintiff, there being no reply to the counterclaim. 
Plaintiff's counsel informed the court he had a reply 
prepared and ready for filing and that counsel for defendant 
did not discover the omission until informed by plaintiff's 
-2-
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counsel and had not filed a default certificate. 
The Court granted a default judgment against plaintiff 
for the sum of $930.30 which was set off against plaintiff's 
summary judgment, resulting in a net judgment for plaintiff 
of $793.30. 
Plaintiff then filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment which was denied on June 15, 1978. 
Plaintiff has appealed from the granting of default 
judgment and defendant has cross-appealed from the summary 
judgment for plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Ordinarily, the filing of pleadings outside the time 
allowed by the rules of procedure is left to the discretion 
of the trial court. However, where prejudice results from a 
court's ruling on filing of pleadings, the court's action 
constitutes reversible error. Taylor v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. 
Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 P.239 (1923). 
In Taylor, supra, the trial court permitted plaintiff, 
under a former statute, to file a reply to defendant's answer 
at the commencement of the trial and beyond the time allotted 
for replying. In affirming judgment for plaintiff, the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated: 
Appellant predicates error 
on account of the filing of the 
reply. No motion for continuance 
-3-
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was made by defendant, and no 
injury whatever is shown to have 
been suffered by defendant on 
account of the filing of the reply. 
The filing of pleadings out of time 
is generally a matter of discretion 
with the trial court, and when, as 
in this case, it does not appear 
that the opposite party is prejudiced, 
there is no error in permitting it. 
216 P. at 240. 
In the instant case, appellant's counsel had a reply 
prepared and ready to submit at the outset of the trial. Clear. 
the allowing of the reply to be filed by the Court would not ha 
prejudiced respondent in any way. Respondent would still have 
been able to present evidence in support of his counterclaim ~ 
to rebut appellant's reply. 
However, appellant clearly suffered prejudice due to tt 
court's granting o= ~espondent's motion for default judgment. 
Appellant was foreclosed from presenting any evidence to rebut 
the allegations of respondent's counterclaim, resulting in a 
substantial reduction of plaintiff's award. 
Further, in this instance counsel for respondent was 
unaware that no reply had been filed until so informed by coun: 
for appellant. No certificate of default had been filed by 
respondent. 
Quoting from the trial transcript at pages 88-89 of 
the record herein: 
Mr. FANKHAUSER: Your Honor, I'd 
like to enter default to the plaintiff's 
counterclaim, there being no reply thereto 
at this point, and there being none of 
record; therefore, we'd ask judgment on 
the counterclaim. 
-4-
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THE COURT: There is no reply filed 
in the file. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, it occurred 
to me last night as I prepared the file 
that the reply to the counterclaim has 
not been made. 
I prepared it; I have ~here this 
morning. Mr. Fankhauser was not aware 
that no reply had been filed until I 
told him just to advise him, and now 
he seeks to gain some advantage by that, 
I think the Court ought to receive the 
reply to the counterclaim at this time, 
since we didn't have adequate notice 
for his motion for default, since he 
doesn't have a default certificate 
prepared; and therefore, I think the 
reply to the counterclaim ought to be 
received. 
The ruling of the trial court in granting default judg-
ment permitted respondent's counsel to take advantage of his own 
inadvertence or neglect inasmuch as he was not aware of the lack 
of a reply until so informed by appellant's attorney. 
Further, it may be argued that counsel for appellant had 
no duty to file a reply to respondent's counterclaim. Respondent's 
counsel claimed in his answer he was "reserving" the right to 
file a counterclaim. There is no provision in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for such without first seeking leave of court. 
Rule 13(a), U.R.C.P., states in part: 
A pleading shall state as a 
counterclaim any cla~m wh~ch at the time 
of serving the plead~ng the pleader 
has aga~nst any opposing party, if 
it arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter 
of the opposing party's claim ..•. 
(emphasis added) 
At least as to respondent's counterclaims for labor 
performed in August, 1975, and for cutting decking for a trailer, 
-5-
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those claims coincide in time and nature with appellant's 
fourth and fifth claims for relief. Consequently, they were 
compulsory counterclaims which must have been filed at the time 
the answer was filed unless respondent sought leave of court to 
file at a later time. 
Since the answer when filed contained no counterclaim, 
the pleading designated as a counterclaim and filed six months 
after the answer amounted to an amendment of the answer, 
Appellant was not required to reply to the original answer sine 
it contained no counterclaim. Thus, pursuant to Rule 15(a), 
U.R.C.P., respondent must have first sought leave of court to 
file an amended pleading to include claims against appellant, 
whether compulso~y or permissive. 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT WAS ERROR. 
The general rule is that courts do not favor default 
judgments. Utah Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 
53 P, 1033 (1898). 
In the instant case, appellant was present at trial witt 
his attorney who had a reply in hand and ready to file. 
Consequently, it may be argued that, under Rule 55(a) (1} ,~ 
appellant was nttin default so as to justify granting judgment 
respondent's counterclaim. 
If it be construed that a reply must in fact have been 
filed prior to trial, then appellant is still afforded relief 
by virtue of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., which reads in part: 
-6-
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On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in 
furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; 
Certainly, under the facts of the instant case, appellant's 
counsel failed to file a reply due to inadvertence or excusable 
neglect. The counterclaim was not filed until six months after 
the answer and, in fact, after appellant had served, and respondent 
had answered, a number of interrogatories and requests for 
production. It is not surprising that counsel for appellant was 
not monitoring carefully the proposed counterclaim. 
The denial of the motion to set aside default was an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. The purpose of the rules 
of pleading are to promote justice, not the dogged adherence to 
procedural rules. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, appellant urges this Court to 
reverse the judgment of the lower court. 
DATED this~~ay of September, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Att ey for Appellant 
-7-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed ~~f the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney 
for Respondent, at 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this~~~ay of September, 1978. 
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